The following are the outputs of the captioning taken during an IGF intervention. Although it is largely accurate, in some cases it may be incomplete or inaccurate due to inaudible passages or transcription errors. It is posted as an aid, but should not be treated as an authoritative record.
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>> MARKUS KUMMER: Okay. Can you hear me? I can still hear music ‑‑ (laughter) ‑‑
Okay. Good morning, everyone. It's all a bit complicated here. We have to put our headsets on, and we're on channel 5.
(Corrections were made)
>> MARKUS KUMMER: Sorry. We're on channel 5.
And to the technician, can you stop the background.
>> Background music is on 4.
(Laughter)
>> MARKUS KUMMER: Got it. Okay. I was on the wrong channel.
(Laughter)
>> MARKUS KUMMER: Well, it's very complicated, yes.
(Laughter)
>> MARKUS KUMMER: And we're not young people anymore. We're celebrating the 20‑year anniversary on the working group of the Internet Governance Forum.
Whatever you say, you can hear it because the microphones are on permanently. If you have any side conversations, we can hear it.
Anyway, it's a great pleasure to have you here. It's a class reunion to celebrate. We're all still walking. Nobody is in a wheelchair yet. Somebody said maybe we have to ask for a doctor to be in the room just in case.
Be that as it may, I took the liberty of using my AI assistant that I have on my phone to ask a WGIG matter.
It's a difficult question, and the answers are yes and no, but, in conclusion, it says the WGIG plays a role in the development and promotion of Internet governance and may have less impact than some would have desired.
This is sort of a wishy‑washy intelligence, I thought.
We were thought of the process. We actually thought we had a tremendous impact. It was a bit of a game‑changer in the WSIS process, which, before, was very much government only and really opened the doors to a multistakeholder participation.
And we thought, okay, let's look back a bit and also look forward a bit. And we divided to have it in three segments.
When I say "we," it was Bill who put it together. One is on the nature of Internet governance. One segment is on multilateral and multistakeholder, which is seen by some as an antagonist situation.
And the last segment is looking forward. Does the IGF live up to expectation? What should change and what should not?.
With that, I will hand it over to Bill, who will provide some framing of the session.
>> WILLIAM DRAKE: Hello, everybody. Well, thank you all for coming, first of all, because there's a lot going on at the same time. We're here not because we think that WGIG was put out to solve all the problems. It was put out under various conditions.
However, there was a lot of impact on the process that's been lasting, and I think it's worth taking note of that since this is the 20th anniversary of the WSIS, how could we not talk about the WGIG, which played a role in bringing the WSIS to conclusion.
So I thought it would be useful to get the band back together again and do this.
So I'm just going to make a few points about the impact of the WSIS, and that's based, in part, on the two books we did together. Members of the group got together and contributed to two chapters to books, one I edited in 2005 and one in 2015. That was the 10th anniversary.
In those books, I had chapters on why WGIG mattered. I'm going to run through a couple of points to level‑set us to get us on the same page.
I don't know how many people remember the WGIG. I talked to people at the party last night, and people said they come to the IGF, but they don't know where it came from.
A lot of history has gone dark as we've gotten older and new people have cycled in.
So I think it's important to level‑set us and say what this thing was.
So I'm going to make three points about the contributions, and then we'll go to inclusive discussion with all the people here as well as those online.
So I would start by saying that the WGIG contributed in a way that had not been seen before in the Internet Governance Forum space. For those who are old and around the WSIS process, you may remember that in the early stages, stakeholders were being locked out of rooms, thrown out of rooms, told not to speak. The whole thing was kind of a mess for a long time. It took a while for the whole multistakeholder thing, the ethos, to start to kick in.
WGIG contributed to that and showed the multistakeholder collaboration could be effective, problem‑solving, and that, indeed, stockholders could make real contributions to the kind of proposal and substantive learning that everybody was doing as we came together and groped toward some shared understandings of things.
Secondly, the WGIG facilitated the WSIS negotiations. For those of you, again, who were around, you may remember for the first couple of years in the Geneva cycle, people were saying things were all over the place. We don't know what's going on. It's not cumulative. We're going to nowhere.
This brought the discussion in a methodical basis and laid out the main issues out in a way that everybody could understand.
The WGIG promoted engagement. We did a lot of things that now we take for granted but back then were new, in terms of having public comments and having open, transparent processes, having everything on the web, having simultaneous translation in the sessions.
It was all new back then.
In terms of substantive contributions, the WGIG played a role in the scope of Internet governance. There was a lot of debate about is there such a thing as Internet governance? Does the term make sense?
You had people who said, Well, if there's Internet governance, it just means what ICANN does or what intergovernmental agencies like the ITU should be doing.
We were able to work through it. Governance does not mean government. We needed an approach that took into the account the use of the Internet and the rules that applied to digital trade, privacy, et cetera, on transactions going on over the Internet.
We developed a working definition, which was drawn from the political science literature that set out who does Internet governance, where is it done, et cetera?
All of that is important.
We took the pressure off like how ITU could take over, and we decentered that and the controversy completely.
In lite of the broad definition, we mapped out all of the things that are part of the ecosystem and clustered them and made them attractable, in terms of discussions.
We had a process where colleagues put out different visions for oversight of Internet governance, of critical Internet resources. This is the first chance at putting aside ITU and various members came up with proposals for a Global Internet Council and Global Internet Policy Council, all new types of things. None of these were agreed on as a group, but it helped shape the discussion about enhanced cooperation and things like that.
So that, I think, was probably useful in advancing the discussion.
Also, most importantly, from the point of this group, the WGIG proposed to solve the ‑‑ let's have a permanent space attached to the United Nations where we can continue to have open discussion without the pressure of negotiating outcomes and so on.
So those were seven ways in which the WGIG, I think, made a meaningful, impactful contribution to the conclusion of the WSIS process but also helped lay the foundation for everything that's gone on in the year subsequent.
So that's just a little background to refresh us, for those who have not thought about the WGIG in 20 years.
So we'll go through three forward‑looking questions, asking colleagues to talk about how we think about some of the contemporary problems with the perspective of what we did 20 years ago.
>> MARKUS KUMMER: Thank you, Bill.
The WCAG report found its way into the final outcome of the WSIS agenda. There's a chapter on Internet governance, which is more or less taken verbatim from the WGIG report.
That's the impact of the WGIG that we manage to feed into the process.
For those who attended the summit, there was a difference in phases. The Tunis phase was far more open in terms of procedure. In Geneva, the senior of ICANN was kicked out of the room.
Some said, Hey, this guy is not government. He needs to be taken out.
Whereas, in Tunis, the ICANN community was present. The Chair or the CEO was sometimes asked for his comments or opinion on some of the items, and that was also an indirect impact of WGIG. It would not have happened without WGIG.
But with that, we now come to the first chapter, the Nature of Internet Governance.
I have three members of the WGIG grew, Ayesha, Raul, and Wolfgang.
We'll ask others to come in after the first segment, but can I invite Ayesha.
Was there a time where the voice of business, so to speak, you were the representative of ICC, and people listened to what you had to say.
Over to you, Ayesha.
>> AYESHA HASSAN: Thank you. It's an honor to be here, and it was a pleasure to serve.
I was with the umbrella of global business, CCBI.
Yes, we've come a long way, but the definition has stood the test of time. I think it's still valid.
I think that it has been nicely shaped so that it has adapted.
In terms of the nature of Internet governance today, I think that it has expanded, in the sense that many emerging technologies or captions that we have today didn't exist at the time, but that is part of what we're talking about now, in terms of Internet governance, whether it's AI governance or other technologies.
So I think the discussion that we started 20 years ago is now at a place where we want to keep looking to having adaptable ways to address these issues.
One of the things the WGIG really did, in my view, was foster collaborative relationships and the idea of discussing things across the stakeholder groups, which really didn't exist before.
I want to share an anecdote. At the time, I was global business. At one point, our esteemed chairman, Nitin laughed. He said, oh, my god, do I hear you agreeing?
My colleague is here with me today. Yes. We talked to each other. That's lasted over the years and fostered by the IGF itself, giving people a chance to talk to people they may not have a chance to have a coffee and truly exchange with.
I'm purposely emphasising that because that is an asset. I think that's part of what the WGIG started, and the IGF has continued to foster it.
So I will stop with that, at this point.
>> MARKUS KUMMER: Thank you, Ayesha, for that. And I think anecdotes are always good to liven the debate a little bit. And it's history.
Raul, can you come in?
>> RAUL ECHEBERRIA: Thank you. It's nice to be here with you 20 years later. I don't know why the rest of the people look 20 years older. Not myself.
(Laughter)
>> RAUL ECHEBERRIA: I don't know what happened with the rest of the people.
WGIG was really an innovative experience and innovative way to address the difficulties that have presented during the first phase of the summit.
As Markus said, it was very different. The first phases were very different.
It was an achievement itself, the WGIG, as Ayesha also pointed out.
All of us learned about how to work better with the other stakeholders.
It was very helpful to have an informal discussion in Tunis.
I remember also bringing an anecdote, that there were a lot of discussions in the WGIG about who managed the root server A, and some of us were trying to explain to other people that the root server A was not important.
So I said, No because why you question our position?
No, I'm not questioning your positions. What we are saying here is the problem is not with server A. The problem is more complex.
The discussion, the level of discussion, in 2005 was different than 2023.
When we look nowadays at the forums that are involved in different ways with the Internet governance, not all of them are pure multistakeholder models, but all of them ‑‑ or most of them ‑‑ are open to the position of all stakeholders, and this is important because we consolidated the idea that the opinion of all stakeholders is crucial. It's important. And it's very, very important still today.
Sometimes the things we take for granted are not. With all the political changes that we are seeing around the world, things that we assume were discussions from the past probably will come back to the table in the near future.
So it's important that we continue reinforcing the idea that that participation of all stakeholders is crucial and that we need, in this ever‑changing world, we need to be more efficient in digital policies, to be more efficient, to have the right policies on time, we need the participation of everybody from the inception of the process from the region of the discussions.
So I think those lessons that we learned 20 years ago remain very important and valuable.
I wouldn't just say value. It's crucial for the future of the governance ‑‑ the digital governance in general.
>> MARKUS KUMMER: Thank you, Raul.
Over to Wolfgang.
>> WOLFGANG KLEINWACHTER: Thank you. I was a member of the Civil Society and the community. One was from the government. Ayesha from the business, and then from the technical community, it's demonstrating already that there was a unique culture of collaboration by trying to promote the understanding.
I will also start with an anecdote.
From the general assembly in 2001 ‑‑ some people raised the issue, and then we had a meeting in Paris. This was a night meeting in the cellar, and it was unclear whether the governmental people can join the working group 5. Now we're on the workshop 5.
So it was a new working group because we had four different working groups. There was no control on the entrance.
Non‑state actors moved into the room. And then the debate started. Somebody talked about IP.
An Ambassador from the country that I won't mention said, What is IP interest?
And then ‑‑ stepped in and explained how domain names are functioning.
Then the director, oh, this was very helpful. Thank you so much.
This was the start of the mutual recognition that every stakeholder can bring a different expertise to the table.
But from Paris, it was in July 2003 to December 2003, the complexity was still on the low levels. So people did not understand what we were talking about. That's why the WGIG got to mandate what Internet governance is.
It had not only mandated to work on recommendations but also to give it definition.
The discussion around this definition is really crucial and Bill mentioned that already. When we worked on the definition, we had two options at the end of the day.
A narrow definition, just to concentrate on the critical Internet resources, names and numbers, or a pro definition.
And confronted with the complexity of the mandate of the WSIS, we decided in favour of the pro definition, and this is what Bill said also on who and what and how.
And these are the three elements which are defined in these three lines of the paragraph in the Tunis agenda. Okay. All stakeholders have to be involved in their respective roles.
I was fighting to the very last moment to add "in equal footing." Okay. Respective roles include a certain way that everybody is equal in their respective roles.
But, anyhow, this was the first element. All stakeholders have to be involved.
The second verse, sharing, sharing non‑principles and even decision‑making procedures that are the collaborative approach. And then we differentiated between the evolution and the use of the Internet.
So the technical and the political layer, and this was the holistic approach.
If I take these basic elements of the definition, the multistakeholder approach, the collaborative approach, and the holistic approach, then I think this definition is really universal and can be used for all governance aspects, which we are discussing today, 20 years later, because 20 years ago, Internet governance was the term that covered all the things.
Instead, we have seen a lot of new language appearing around governance. We have digital governance, ICT governance, cyber governance, IoT governance.
What is the difference between the pro definition of Internet governance if you just take these three approaches.
AI governance has to be multistakeholder. AI governance has to be collaborative. And without a holistic approach, you will fail to find any sustainable solutions for AI.
That means you have to take into consideration all elements and public policy.
Discussions we had 20 years ago sometimes reappears as confusion about AI governance. It's simple. Go back to what we had produced 20 years ago.
Thank you.
>> MARKUS KUMMER: Thank you for that, Wolfgang.
And, yes, the Tunis agenda has a whole chapter on Internet governance with explanatory paragraphs, and they make it clear that anything related to the use and abuse of Internet is part of the Internet governance, and all these applications you mentioned, AI and whatever, they rely on the Internet. Without the Internet digital, without the Internet, it's not just about the standalone computer. It's about connecting the computers.
But I would like to invite other WGIG members, if they would like to add anything, but also open the floor to other participants, if you have comments or questions.
Juan, you would like to come in, please?
>> Juan: Yes. Well, good morning. I'm not going to talk about the substantial achievements of the WGIG because it was just mentioned, the working definition, and the rest of the mandate.
To ask a group of intelligent persons that have different viewpoints to agree in a very contentious subject, it just seems lake being crazy, you know, because if you have people with similar opinions, that's okay. But to have 30 people with different opinions to get to the results, it's a challenge. And it was done.
And I'm going to share with you about the methodology of how it was done because I think it's useful for many discussions that are being carried out now.
Throughout the years we were working, we had a lot of opinions. I think Bill mentioned all that opinions, and it was all collected in a very big document.
And then, at the end ‑‑ because we had to have a report. We were placed into a chateau, and they threw out the key. You don't get out until you have a report.
We have very, very large material that will be impossible to collate.
We will have a big report where all the opinions will be collected. It's a compendium. It's been mentioned that that's been very useful because the many interests were there. Then people can take it out and materialise it later.
And then to concentrate in the actual report.
Of course, then, we have a lot of things in which we had consensus. We put it there. We discussed the definition, as Wolfgang just said, with some tweaks there. But, in the end, there were the recommendations of the ‑‑ how would you call it? ‑‑ the arrangements for the government. There was no consensus in a final one.
So we decided that we would try to narrow down the different proposals to the bare basics, and we finally ended with four different ones.
I think this is a contribution of this report, and it's a methodology that can be used in some discussions that we are going to have now, for instance, in data governance and some other. We don't have to get to one final consensus because maybe that's impossible, but if we can narrow down and put the basic alternatives as part of the final report, that is a result because, otherwise, you can say, okay, we don't have consensus, so we don't have results. And that's zero.
So this opens the way to very contingent issues that it's being discussed today to open the way to have results that could be actionable and that can really contribute.
So I think, Markus and Bill and colleagues, that's one of the contributions we made.
Otherwise, we'll still be in the chateau, trying to get answers.
>> It was very good wine.
(Laughter)
>> There's a quick note on this, attracting Juan and Bill both. At that time, you had the belief that your input was taken care of. You had a feeling that it was provided. What is the major problem today is that we have so many processes which call you to have your say, make contribution.
And your contribution disappears in some sort of governance at that angle, and you just come with some documents and say, Okay.
It's fine if somebody says, Okay. We disagree. We cannot accept that. There is a consensus.
The good news is, ideally, we should be locked in some sort of secluded space, as Markus said earlier, a big Master of Diplomacy.
AI is here now. AI can trace the contribution to the final document. It could also be completely ignored. I prefer a human approach, but in the IGF process, when someone asks you to have your say to contribute, that's a reflection.
Agree, disagree, discuss it, whatever.
I'm afraid this is missing now in global governance and also in AI and digital governance.
>> Amen!
>> MARKUS KUMMER: Thank you, Jovan.
I will ask the next speakers to be as compact as possible.
We go to the multilateral and multistakeholder.
The first stakeholder is Alexandre Barbosa, Head, The Regional Center for Studies on the Development of the Information Society, Brazil.
>> Alejandro Pisanty: It's 3:00 a.m. in Mexico City.
Thanks for the invitation and for the first round. It was very useful.
One of the things that happens ‑‑ there was an agreement by the UN General Assembly, so that's something we're not having as often now.
The process like the GDC, Global Digital Compact, seemed to have been designed in order to make it much harder for voices that would have been the WGIG to make even a dent on the decisions that have already been made by the Secretary‑General and adjunct and the few governments.
Multilateral and multistakeholder, we have to ‑‑ I'm convinced that all problems of Internet governance and many others are much better solved by multistakeholder collaboration.
We have to be able to involve governments decisively. When things involve law enforcement, even if the involvement is informal, it has to be very enabling, as it's happening in the working group or the upcoming alliance.
In other places, the governments really have themselves decided to sit in the second row. That's happened to us when we were doing the ICANN reform process in 2001 and 2003.
Seats at the table were offered to ‑‑ and they had very good reasons. Some is they would have to ‑‑ the governments. Then they couldn't agree on how many representatives. What we have learned on the multistakeholder process is how different stakeholders perceive what is important, what is decisive, and what is pretty standard.
As you know, we have a scheme for translating things, for example, like using identity, the mass scale of the Internet, lowering barriers, lowering friction, and managing memory, and forgetting to understand what problems are not actually a problem created by the Internet but modified ‑‑ disruptive, if you want.
In some of these cases, you need a layer in terms of the multistakeholder problem.
The consequences of choosing multistakeholder or multilateral, is it different in the countries that propose multilateral? That's the average test of why we need to keep pushing for multistakeholder. Every single country that pushes for normal multilateral is also pushing against Internet freedom.
Thank you.
>> MARKUS KUMMER: Thank you for that, Alejandro. And thank you for joining us at your ungodly hour in your country.
>> Alejandro Pisanty: Lovely.
>> AVRI DORIA: I think at the moment, we have to coexist. We see that in examples like the ICANN example. We see that in examples like the Cipalo (phonetic) guidelines. There's talk about how to bring the two together.
Now, there's a wonderful part of WGIG. I think it's the last time we actually participated as equals. And that's one of the things I've looked for since then. WGIG truly was ‑‑ I was able to sit there and argue for hours against some of the roles and responsibilities as believed by governments and until Nitin got tired of it, it was allowed to go on.
And that is important. That's something that does not happen at the moment because even in our multistakeholder models, even something like the IGF that grew out of WGIG, it's a top‑down.
There's an authority that we all answer to in some way. We all appeal to. We all have to go to.
So the multistakeholder is there. I would never say that IGF isn't multistakeholder but not completely, not fully. It has a ways to develop.
And WGIG does give an example. It does sort of point a way of it can work, and we've seen other examples where it can work.
It was an interesting example to me.
I came in as a techie, new nothing about Internet governance, knew a little bit about philosophy. I knew what ICANN was.
I learned a lot through the process and found it valuable. It obviously changed my life.
One of the things I want to point out ‑‑ and I'm not sure it fits in this thing, but there was one feature on the working group on Internet governance that we've lost. We had Frank March, our main writer, sitting in the room with us, while he was writing, talking to us asking about paragraphs.
That goes further on the notion that now we sort of contribute our comments into a bucket somewhere, and somebody may look at them, may not look at them, may include a word or two but not.
We actually sat there irritating this poor, lovely man saying, no, no, no, you have to change that word. I need this paragraph.
And he actually bore with it.
So while we're all talking about the wonder of WGIG, I wanted to bring up the wonderful example of Frank.
So I think for the foreseeable future, we have to work on a way to combine the two because governments are not going to give up their multilateral insofar as they can get beyond unilateral. But they're not going to give it up anytime.
And we can't afford to give up a multistakeholder model. So they have to work in contention, which is not that useful, or figure out how to work together.
I think we have some motion in that direction. I think WGIG started it. I think it's always good to go back to reading not only the report but, as several people said, the background report. There's so much in there to play with. And I recommend it to any student.
So, hopefully, that answered my part of the question.
>> MARKUS KUMMER: Thank you. I think Frank played an important role. Thank you for sharing a thought on him. He passed away, sadly, a couple of years back. That was very sad to learn. He was really an important help for us to produce the report.
And the last speaker on this segment ‑‑ and thank you, all, for moving away from the multilateral and multistakeholder.
The Brazilians always make the case of the false dichotomy between the two.
Charles, you put your name down for that. Can you also say if there's anything to report on what's happening in the Zoom room.
Please, Charles.
>> CHARLES SHA'BAN: Thank you very much, Markus.
In fact, I think what I will say is I will start by saying that I was still young in the Internet governance sphere. Not age. I'm still young in age.
It was a really wonderful experience, as my colleagues mentioned, to sit with the different stakeholders.
And the specific example of intellectual property was problematic. You can say that during that specific time. Everybody knows the UDRP. I think without the multistakeholderism, we couldn't have this policy on the Internet.
Why? It started with ICANN. Why? We can say the private sector, lawyers and the civil society, were an important part to find a way how to find these different solutions for the Internet domain and specific.
I would like to mention this to have addition to what my colleagues already covered, I think, in general.
So maybe the last sentence, I will agree ‑‑ I will consider it a remote moderation today. I think multilateralism will stay too. I think we need to find how to keep the multistakeholder, which is important, bottom‑up, and to find a way to work with the multilateral mechanisms.
Thank you.
>> MARKUS KUMMER: Thank you very much.
There was a time when there was a real antagonism between multistakeholder and multilateral. One said multilateral is bad and multistakeholder is good.
Working for Switzerland, we always believe in multilateral because it protects the smaller countries. Multilateral is always better than unilateralism.
We feel strengthened through unilateralism ‑‑ multilateralism.
We had a close session on the ‑‑ rule. We always opened up, and the day before, we lad the open conversation. We thought we could have the same for IGF. It was built on that model.
So as the IGF lived up to our expectations, and what should we do to move forward?
We have two remote speakers here, Baher Esmat, ICANN, Technical Community, Asia‑Pacific Group and Carlos Afonso, Instituto Nupef, Civil Society, GRULAC.
>> BAHER ESMAT: I want to take part in this discussion alongside by WGIG colleagues.
The IGF, today, we're almost 19 years into this global forum, and I think the IGF has been the primary global multistakeholder forum for discussing Internet governance issues. It kind of filled a gap that was identified by the WGIG members 20 years ago.
It provided a space for discussion ‑‑ an open discussion among all stakeholders from government and private sector, civil society, technical, academia, all on equal footing. It has also contributed to a very important element to those coming from the developing world, which is the capacity‑building aspect.
And I think today, numerous regional and National IGFs and similar platforms for Internet governance shows the impact of the IGF over the years.
Another point I would like to point to very quickly ‑‑ and I think some of the previous speakers have touched on ‑‑ which is how the IGF has evolved over time. I think the IGF has been continuously evolving over the past years.
We've seen this in many aspects from, you know, trying to improve its outcomes in the forms of whether messages and reports and so on but also in the form of topics and issues being addressed during the meetings.
As someone noted earlier, you know, this debate between Internet governance and other definitions, I think because of the way the WGIG approached the issue of the defining Internet governance and seeing the definition itself is broad enough to sort of encompass a lot of issues, most of which are not even foreseen. They did not exist 20 years ago.
So the IGF, over the years, has evolved in its agenda, and we've seen many topics that were not on the WGIG radar in 2024 and 2005.
AI is the most popular, but there are many others.
And I think this evolution is one of the key characteristics of the IGF.
The other characteristics that have been debated over the years is the non‑decision‑making nature of the IGF.
While some have debated this is one of the weaknesses of the IGF, personally, I believe it's one of the strengths, and I think it was not a bug in the system. I think it was intentional, by design, to be made as, again, an open and non‑decision‑making forum to allow everyone to contribute and participate on equal footing.
Now, looking to the future ‑‑ and this is my last point ‑‑ I think as we consider how to evolve the IGF and strengthen and improve the IGF, I believe the financial stability and sustainability of IGF is key. For the IGF to continue to serve as the global Internet Governance Forum, I think we need the minds of all the participants and the contributors to the IGF to come together and consider more innovative ideas to sort of, you know, guarantee or at least offer or put forward a sustainable model to support the IGF to continue its role at the global level.
Thank you.
>> MARKUS KUMMER: And the next speaker is Carlos Afonso. Are you joining us from Rio?
>> CARLOS AFONSO: Yes, I am joining from Rio. Yes! I am there.
>> MARKUS KUMMER: Great to see you, Carlos.
>> CARLOS AFONSO: (Laughter). So I find it a little bit complicated to find new things, really. The report we did in 2005, Avri mentioned a very important thing that Fred march did a beautiful work of patience, of listening to us and trying to synthesise everything.
It was really great. And the report is much, much more than the definition. I think we did the definition that was to stand the test of time. Simple for the standard test of time, but it's still very simple, in relation to all the complex issues we are facing. No?
But the report was so important because it identified four key public policy areas, which are still the main public policy areas, whatever the development of the Internet.
And these four policy areas we managed to detail in 13 issues, fundamental issues, we share until today.
So I think more than the definition, the report is a very good reference, which the report itself is standing the test of time.
This is great. I think this is what is the main contribution we could do in that group at the time.
Thank you.
>> MARKUS KUMMER: Thank you very much, Carlos. Great to see you.
Now, back to the room. And we have Jovan and Vittorio.
>> JOVAN KURBALIJA: I don't know if it's the right time, but since we'll have time during the coffee breaks, I will propose the future of IGF, which may be a contribution from all people in the room.
The first one ‑‑ and thank you for parking it ‑‑ the false dichotomy of multistakeholder versus multilateral.
If you look at the compromise, you will see the IGF is a masterpiece of compromise by putting the multistakeholder body under the UN umbrella.
For the first time, issues were in the UN and then there were multistakeholder participation.
It will have to be revisited. It cannot stay fixed in stone.
As Executive Director of the UN high‑level panel, I try to argue for IGF+.
I will now open controversies.
I argued that the famous, very controversial, big elephant in the room, the in‑house corporation should be brought as one of the track on the first day of IGF together with governments, Civil Society, businesses discussing.
We may call it enhanced collaboration ‑‑ I understand political positioning elements of it, but it was a very simple solution to put that last bit from the Tunis formula. A bit of salt, British diplomat on the 8 of November, as the solution to find the package.
That's controversial. I'm sure there will be many questions.
The second point is capacity‑building, and that was a great achievement.
Here is a personal story.
When I started doing IG, my friends asked me, What are you doing?
Then, when I told them what I was doing, they called me to fix their printer and those things.
(Laughter)
>> JOVAN KURBALIJA: I usually did it. It helps people, but I it inspired me to write the book.
Fast forward, a few months ago ‑‑ I wrote the last book eight years ago and thought there was no need.
People convinced me, and now I'm presenting it on Wednesday. And the question is should I call it Internet Governance.
You will see there's a reason to keep it Internet governance. Issues are the same. They're not asking me anymore to install their printer. They're asking me about the knowledge. Who is basically monopolising that knowledge? The discussion moved on.
By me writing the book every year and now revisiting this book is a great sort of diary of the Internet Governance Forum and its achievement.
And the third point, which Bill mentioned, is extremely important. It's modus operandi of the IGF that's sometimes underestimated.
I will give you a personal story. 15 years ago, I went to the IGF. You will find the date, but you know how it goes. You come the first day, and you have big ambitions, great speakers, workshops, and you want to follow it all.
After the first morning, you realise that you cannot do it, and you end up in the cafeteria, meeting friends and chatting.
There's always the feeling of the missed opportunities. I missed something. This is how the reporting started, first with humans, former students and interns, and now it's helped with the ‑‑ and the development of methodologies, where things are here. We have AI! Let's install the AI agents.
But in all that work, capacity‑building, bringing consensus, involving other people from our side, this reporting, I think it's great of the IGF, and on that legacy, we should build the future.
Revisit Tunis formula, we need to do it. That's first.
Second, continue capacity‑building that's one of the great achievements of IGF.
And third one, talk more about the modus operandi of the IGF.
>> MARKUS KUMMER: Thank you, Jovan.
And the last speaker is Vittorio.
>> VITTORIO BERTOLA: Thank you. As the former younger member, I must also start some controversy.
I think we're at the point in time where we need to think of the future of the IGF. So we need to also look at what worked and what didn't work.
So maybe I would start with the practical way of working with the IGF. I think in the overall, we liked this. So we continue coming. I think everybody finds value in coming to the IGF. I think it should continue.
I think it could be better. Especially this year, there's people disappointed because they have been trying to propose a session and they don't get accepted. There's a lack of space. There's a limit to how many you can have. But we have to find a way to mobilize those energies.
They come and try several years and get disappointed and go away and say the IGF is just for smoke, just for insiders, just for whatever.
I think the other thing that will solve this problem is a much better working of the National IGF especially.
Our experience with the Italian IGF is terrible. Six or seven years ago, it was captured by the government and used by a politician for self‑promotion. They were not meeting anymore. It didn't happen for several years. Now it's still in the hands of the government. And it's a new government. In six years, we have several governments with multiple colours.
It's multistakeholder in the sense that there's multiple involved.
(Laughter)
>> VITTORIO BERTOLA: So I think we need to address these things. It could affect the credibility and make the process better.
The other part of the question is the IGF and the question in the programme is, I mean, did it meet the purpose that we thought it would meet. And to be honest, while part of the definition worked well, nobody is really unhappy with the governance of the technical sources, but the broader definition did not work well.
So 20 years later, we thought the Internet would be an instrument for progress.
I quoted this. One month ago, there was a survey in the UK. They asked the young people: Would you live better off if the Internet did not exist?
Half of them said yes. So this is really, really terrible for us, those that worked to create it and make it a mass instrument.
By putting everyone together, we thought we would be able to address the economic and social questions, and this didn't happen, especially because of the private sector, I have to say. The private sector, people who can make money, they just went on and made money, and nobody could stop them because we had cattle but no stick.
So this is the transition of countries and the European Union who have been in favour of open governments and whatever. But there's a ‑‑ approach.
That's why we're getting pressure from multilateral.
I don't like the idea of more multilateralism, but I also don't like to continue with very large companies that are doing whatever they want over the Internet.
So maybe the national level will be more important. I don't have an answer on how to build a new balance between all the stakeholders, but, indeed, there needs to be reflection that includes the IGF but takes into account that now governments really need to have a need to have rules over global businesses, and this is the tension that is not going away.
Thank you.
>> MARKUS KUMMER: Well, thank you, Vittorio.
Also, thank you for asking tough questions.
I see there are already reactions.
Charles?
>> CHARLES SHA'BAN: Maybe I shall first, but there's a question online.
>> MARKUS KUMMER: Go ahead.
>> CHARLES SHA'BAN: In fact, there was some discussions, and Bill already answered some of them, but one of the questions online without a response is from Chairperson Bangladesh IGF, given the rise of AI, surveillance technologies, should we work on defining digital governance, one that centred the life realities members of women and youth and marginalised communities?
>> MARKUS KUMMER: Ayesha and Avri, yes.
>> AYESHA HASSAN: I think the IGF is the watering hole. The way it is, it has evolved over 20 years. There's many ways in which each year, it's a different experience. And the range of stakeholders has expanded in all the different stakeholder groups.
So, as we look forward, I think it's encouraging, the topics that are important to be taken up here, whether in the workshops or the main sessions. You know, I was very pleased this year to see resilience being there. I believe that resilience is a challenge of the future, and it's not just about how to survive one shock. It's about how do you build capacity across the layers, and how is this worked on across stakeholder groups to raise awareness about it?
And now, unfortunately, for the young people who wish the Internet didn't exist, it does. Our economies, political systems, everything, we depend on this wonderful thing called the Internet.
So I just wanted to say that now I think an issue for everyone to come around together on is also resilience. How do we keep this being as reliant as possible.
Jovan, I'm waiting for the new edition of your puzzle. Do you remember your puzzle?
>> JOVAN KURBALIJA: It's coming. It's even more complicated.
>> AVRI DORIA: There was a time in the IGF where we couldn't even mention the word rights or the notion of it. We had long, long battles of, my God! Rights belongs within some other department within the UN. You cannot talk about rights.
We're not doing a lot of it. So the question is right. When can we start talking about them more?
Any notion we have that IGF is bottom‑up is something that we should stop pretending. It is not. It has not been. I would love to see it, but it isn't.
You don't get to be bottom‑up by having an occasional consultation that you ignore.
So we are a tribe of groups. We come here. We come here in our tribes, and we argue for our points, but we've been told what points we're going to be able to argue from by those who control it.
So I love the IGF. I would love to see it continue, and I would really like to see it become bottom‑up.
>> MARKUS KUMMER: Thank you.
Charles?
>> CHARLES SHA'BAN: For me, Alejandro has his hand raised. Do you want to come in?
>> Alejandro Pisanty: Looking to the future of the IGF, another type of feedback I get is we should make sure it doesn't become rights ‑‑ winter. We have to make sure we engage substantively, decision makers and higher‑level officials that don't stay apart in their own corrals but really to have these conversations, it has to be bottom‑up.
We have to make sure there's engagement or it's too much corridor and ‑‑ multistakeholder engagement.
>> MARKUS KUMMER: Thank you.
I would like to open the discussion to the floor.
Easiest way is for those who have a comment or question, just align behind one of the microphones.
Yes, Raul, please.
>> RAUL ECHEBERRIA: Maybe give priority.
>> MARKUS KUMMER: Okay. Please.
>> FLOOR: Thank you. Good morning, everybody. Can you hear me?
>> MARKUS KUMMER: Yes, we can hear you.
>> FLOOR: First and foremost, I'm with the Africa City Alliance, been in the system for quite a few. I want to salute you for the great work you've done.
First off, I want to talk about your last point made about bottom‑up. Actually, we need to understand that it has always been top‑down, always been top‑down. It's going to take a while before it becomes bottom‑up.
ICANN, by design, is bottom‑up. We need patience and perseverance, and we need to engage and talk about it.
And multilateralism and multistakeholderism. I love everyone claiming ownership. But I have an experience too. We were accused, in the private sector, that we wanted to take over the work of government.
So I had to make an explanation that, no, we are paying the government to ‑‑ for the citizens.
After that explanation, I think the accusations stopped. I never heard about it anymore.
I think we need to continuously engage and explain clearly our intention. Better information society where nobody is left behind and where we all work together and achieve purposes.
Jovan, you make an important comment about issue of consensus. I recall, at the conclusion of WGIG in 2018, January 2018, we could not have consensus because we were expecting 100% consensus.
But if what you're saying now is what we adopted, near consensus, or 99% consensus, maybe we could have a report that says this is the outcome of this group.
So the question is if we had the report based on what you have said, do you think the follow‑up summit of the future would have happened? By July, the high‑level panel on digital cooperation ‑‑ would get filled.
Thank you.
>> MARKUS KUMMER: Thank you. Should we go to the microphone behind? Please introduce yourself.
>> ‑‑ if you were to give a single piece of advice on the facilitators on how to reach or generate consensus for the process, for the document they are drafting, what would it be that you would recommend to them? That's the only question I have.
>> MARKUS KUMMER: Okay. That's a short question. I will take it back to the panellists.
Anriette?
>> ANRIETTE ESTERHUYSEN: Do you think the IGF is ready to actually handle controversial issues? I think we've spent so many times ‑‑ I support what Jovan is saying. This fear of putting enhanced cooperation on the agenda, surely the IGF is mature enough now to do that.
This fear of putting issues that are controversial, like fair tax payment by big tech companies, do you feel the IGF is mature enough to do that?
Having worked, as an example, it took years before we could talk about human rights at the IGF. It took years before we could talk about LGBTQ issues at the IGF.
Is the IGF mature enough to have a debate on controversy as opposed to a strategy that's based on avoiding any kind of risk or controversial topic?
>> MARKUS KUMMER: All important questions.
Again, back to the second microphone, please, yes.
>> FLOOR: Hi. I'm from India and part of the Civil Society Coalition Global Digital Justice Forum.
The panel made observations about the connection between multilateral and multistakeholder should not been seen as ‑‑ when we wanted a bottom line.
We've seen a lot of data governance issues being taken out of a democratic space and into very closed‑door multilateral spaces such as digital trade negotiations.
How can we counter the view? Even though it's ongoing, we see those issues and things in trade deals and ‑‑ multilateral deals.
Thank you.
>> MARKUS KUMMER: Thank you for the question.
>> FLOOR: To comment, I'm happy both Juan and Jovan make a reference to the methodology and the way to work. What was striking, from everything I understood, from the working of WGIG, was this interaction between people.
And Avri was mentioning it as well. Indeed, the role of the secretary had the capacity to make a summary and to present not only one version that's watered down to get consensus but something that says there are different options.
That was extremely important.
The methodology was important, and it could be taken into account for the IGF itself because, as Jordan Carter was saying in an earlier session, the IGF is not supposed to make decisions.
It is, in my view, to help frame the issues and bring the different actors around one topic so that instead of having different sessions addressing the different points of view on the same topic, the different actors can have the kind of interaction that you had within the WGIG.
And, second, a very quick question. The WGIG was a way out of some sort of roadblock at the end of the first phase of the WSIS. It created what all of you have said and what I believe is still, today, the most multistakeholder process that has taken place in 20 years.
We are now stuck with the question of: What is going to be the future of the IGF? And I personally do not believe that the WSIS+20 process, until December, is going to solve the question of what are the next stages.
So my question is: Do you think there would be a benefit in having a sort of new exercise of that sort? A new WGIG after December?
Call it a CSTD (phonetic) working group, whatever, a multistakeholder decision on the decision of the mandate of the IGF after 20 years and ‑‑ a mature organisation with funding and processes?
>> MARKUS KUMMER: Various colleagues put their hands up.
>> Alejandro.
>> MARKUS KUMMER: Alejandro was in the waiting room.
Alejandro, please?
>> Alejandro Pisanty: The consensus is not an objective of the IGF. It's more conveying of different things reminding ourselves that it has to be nonduplicative. So if there's a forum, satellites and the ITU, there's framework and stakeholders that would otherwise be excluded.
The IGF is mature for lots of much more controversial issues. The ones that are not maturing enough are some of the stakeholders, I would say particularly some governments that would like to continue power games in closed venues. Let's say government‑only venues where the politics is more like I will trade you Internet governance for some oil or water rights. So we have to make sure they're as mature as their forum.
Thanks.
>> MARKUS KUMMER: Thank you.
Now we have Raul.
>> RAUL ECHEBERRIA: Yes. Thank you, Markus.
I cannot address all the points, so I will pick a couple of them.
With regard to the maturity of IGF, I think it's aligned with what Alejandro said. Yes, I think the IGF is mature enough.
I remember in 2013, IGF was the first place in the world where we had an open discussion about surveillance after the Snowden relation. It was a high‑level panel. I think it was very good. I organised it.
(Laughter)
>> One of the most difficult moderations. I thought you were my friend.
>> RAUL ECHEBERRIA: So the challenge is it's a commitment of the stakeholders to have those discussions.
So I think the tool is good and mature enough, but I think the point of failure is that the commitment of the stakeholders to come and engage. And, to be honest, I think that we agree on this point. This is not the best moment for international cooperation. So I don't think we can be very optimistic in the short term.
With regard to the question asked about what we would suggest to the facilitators, I'm not sure if you were talking about the work toward the recommendations or the implementation.
It's the same. It's what was mentioned, with regard to the WSIS+20, it's not been participatory enough. It would be great to have an exercise bike WGIG to make the recommendations, but we still have time to include that as recommendation for the future. So I think the idea could be the same.
Thank you.
>> MARKUS KUMMER: Thank you.
And Wolfgang and Avri?
Let's just take a round panel.
>> The short answer is question. We'll see a situation where there's no consensus. The best thing in such a situation, you know, delegate the open questions to a working group.
In German, we say (speaking German) to establish a working group and wait for the future because this is not the time to reach an agreement. It's my pessimistic preview for September.
When we discussed the IGF and the mandate, there was the decision to not give the IGF ‑‑ just to give it a discussion. This has opened the mind, the ears, the eyes for everybody. Everybody can talk to everybody.
But you need ‑‑ and that means if we didn't want to have a government‑controlled Internet but we are rejecting a business‑controlled Internet. That's why the academic, the Civil Society community, the technical community was seen as an important part to bring all perspectives.
What we see now is, indeed, that we are coming in a situation where we have to either detect or the government who wants to manage this.
When Mark Zuckerberg made the announcement that he'll stop content moderation, my first reaction is Mark Zuckerberg should come to the IGF and explain his decision to the broader Internet community.
I think this is what we need.
We have to have the decision‑makers on the table for discussions.
Then they can go home and make the decisions. But it's part of the accountability system for the rulers of the Internet of today. And this meets exactly what Vittorio has said.
>> MARKUS KUMMER: We have one behind the microphone. Are you queuing?
Can you be very short, one minute?
>> FLOOR: Yes. ‑‑ following up with some of the controversial questions and following up and hearing this discussion, so the IGF, as has been discussed, is a forum to discuss issues and frame the issues, and in order to be discussed in a more formal way and come up with decisions and recommendations in the ITU. And that bring as question.
Why would governments actually participate or take a role or be interested, even, in the discussions taking place in the Internet Governance Forum?
So I've heard others saying, well, governments would like to manage the IGF.
Why would they even be interested in managing the IGF? If all what we do here is discussing the issues, framing them, and then moving them to the ITU in order to be discussed in a multilateral forum, and there the decisions are made.
This is my question.
>> MARKUS KUMMER: Thank you. Sebastian?
>> Sebastian: Usually I come to the microphone and speak French. It's not possible here.
(Speaking French)
>> Sebastian: How many government representatives are in the room? They will learn a lot.
The second question is do you want us to book a castle for you for the next discussion?
Thank you.
>> MARKUS KUMMER: Okay. Now we go back to the panel, and we have five minutes left.
We'll start with Avri.
>> AVRI DORIA: Thank you.
I was looking around trying to figure out how many might be government and such. I won't ask for a raise of hands, though I would love to be able to ask for a raise of hands.
We have a couple at the table? Yeah, one.
I wanted to come back to people talking about the models. I think one of the things that happened is with working group Internet Governance Forum, the whole discussion about multistakeholder and multistakeholderism and multistakeholder models really began in earnest. There were certainly examples of it before then, but the model discussion.
And, at this point, we've gotten to where we really have to recognise that the model we have at the IGF is really just one example of a way to do it.
We now have many other models.
We just have to do more work. It can even be a good thing to do at the IGF of understanding the pervasive number of models.
The other thing we have to understand is one of the things that was talked about, which is IGF does not make a decision. There are other stakeholder models that do make decisions. For example, ICANN was brought up. But there, you have a case of marrying sort of a multistakeholder, bottom‑up policymaking with a top‑down corporation doing its thing, and the marriage itself is quite a fascinating thing that needs studying.
So there are an immense number of models.
And the last thing on advice is patience and perseverance.
>> MARKUS KUMMER: Thank you.
>> I wanted to react. I can say why there's no interest of government to come to IGF ‑‑ one of the things we discussed in WGIG is the roles and responsibilities of stakeholders, but we need to define the roles and responsibilities of the processes that are surrounding WSIS. And that is not very well understood.
I found out by experience that the IGF is fantastic as an agenda‑setter, as framing the issues.
Maybe I'm not agreeing with Avri. It can be improved, the bottom‑up, but the workshops are proposed from the bottom, and now we have the ‑‑ the IGF is good to bring to the table problems and issues that may not even be aware by the governments of their own countries themselves, because of the candor in which it's presented during the IGF, especially if you've been in the IGF that's been held in developing countries. There were two in Brazil, the one in Mexico, the one in Kenya.
Okay. So I think that's a good thing.
I think what we need is to really define what is the role of the IGF. The IGF has to be the agenda‑setter. That's the role.
>> MARKUS KUMMER: A very last word.
>> JOVAN KURBALIJA: Why governments are not coming? They're not finding answers to their questions. That's it. 193 member states, easier than a few thousand members of the IGF.
Now, we should not do government bashing. As said, we should explain why they can benefit. Bottom‑up, let's use it with AI. This is a crucial battle. Can we preserve our knowledge through bottom‑up AI, not even Internet governance? This is a critical battle that's happening now and here. Are we regard to start these discussions?
>> MARKUS KUMMER: Last 50 seconds.
Bill?
>> JOVAN KURBALIJA: That's it.
>> WILLIAM DRAKE: Well, obviously not time to say anything, but remember how much time it took to talk about critical Internet resources? The first couple of years of IGF, everybody was so stressed we couldn't even begin to have the conversation.
One way to strengthen the ability of the IGF to actually take on these things is to give us a mandate.
If we didn't fear it being snatched back, maybe we could get through things.
Trade issues in the IGF, it's been hard to talk about that because trade people don't understand this space or care much about it, and, often, it's hard for people to get their mind around the trade.
IGF future, narrowly, we need a group that thinks about the relationship between data governance, Internet governance, AI governance, and so on. There's a lot of confusion. There's an enormous amount of conceptual gunk. This goes to changing the name of the IGF and so on. I think we need to get these issues sorted out and take into account what has already been discussed and learned by people out in the field who do this professionally among other things.
By the way, I can't think of anything the IGF has done on Internet governance. I don't see IGF has making input to the ITU.
>> MARKUS KUMMER: Thank you.
Well, thank you, all, for contributing, the participants and the panellists. You can see, it's 20 years after, and we still talk to each other and are friends.
>> And laugh.
>> MARKUS KUMMER: Please join me in giving all the panellists a big hand, and thank you, all.
(Applause)
